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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

light of the liberalization of post-judgment discovery embodied in
CPLR 5223.19s In at least one area, there is no question that restrictions upon the use of CPLR 5223 exist. A judgment creditor may not
violate a recognized confidential relationship between the judgment
debtor and the third party whom the creditor seeks to examine. 199
The Gres court stated that it was public policy "'to put no obstacle in the path of one seeking to secure the enforcement of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.' "200 Clearly, courts should
assist in the enforcement of such judgments. Other considerations
should be given weight, however, when a judgment creditor attempts
to compel disclosure in a post-judgment proceeding. For example, as
Gres illustrates, a third party's right to privacy can easily be invaded
in such a proceeding. Moreover, CPLR 5223 can be used by a judgment creditor as an instrument of harassment. Ideally, the relevancy
requirement contained in the statute affords a witness some protection
in either of these circumstances. Unfortunately, the existing decisional
law under CPLR 5223 has done little to develop the relevancy requirement as a protective device. The Gres court was presented with
the opportunity to explore this area, but failed to do so. In the future,
courts should be sensitive to the need to more precisely define the
scope of CPLR 5223.
CPLR 5227: Judgment debtor entitled to jury trial in special proceeding brought by judgment creditor.
CPLR 5227 permits a judgment creditor to initiate a special
proceeding against a third party "who it is shown is or will become
195 See Omaha Cold Storage Co. v. Chas. H. Nolte, Inc., 264 App. Div. 740, 34 N.Y.S.2d
433 (2d Dep't 1942) (mem.); In re Schwartz, 175 Misc. 860, 25 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
Kings County 1941). Both Omaha Cold Storage and Schwartz suggested that the judgment
creditor must act on more than mere surmise in seeking to compel production of information in a discovery proceeding. However, with the enactment of CPLR 5223, it has been
argued that the more cautious approach to discovery reflected in these two decisions need
not be followed. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5224, commentary at 97 (1963). See generally 6
WK&-M 5223.05.
199 See note 194 supra. One such recognized privilege operates in the context of an
attorney-client relationship. See Circle Floor Co. v. Silton Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 634, 233
N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962). In Silton, the court permitted tie attorney
of the judgment debtor to be examined in a post-judgment proceeding, subject to the
proviso that there be an opportunity "to raise the question of privilege at the point where
it appears that the witness is about to be asked a question which may disclose confidential
communication." Id. at 635, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 160. It should be noted that the attorneyclient privilege has not been extended to situations where an attorney holds the property
or money of his client, without performing professional services. In such circumstances,
the courts believe the attorney merely functions as an agent for the client. See L. Michel
Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Randall Ave. Theatre Corp., 179 Misc. 998, 39 N.Y.S.2d 830
(N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
200 77 Misc. 2d at 745, 354 N.YS.2d at 762, quoting Leonard v. Wargan, 55 N.Y.S.2d
626, 627 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1945).
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indebted to the judgment debtor." Should the creditor be successful,
the third party, upon maturity of the debt, will be required to pay the
creditor either the entire debt or as much of it as is necessary to
satisfy the judgment. 201 Unlike its predecessor statute,20 2 CPLR 5227
permits the court to settle disputed questions of fact, including a dispute as to the third party's indebtedness. 28 Although, where appropriate, the proceeding contemplates resolution of factual disputes at
trial, it has remained unclear as to when a trial by jury is obtainable. 20 4
The CPLR 5227 proceeding is a hybrid of law and equity. To the
extent that it is aimed at collecting a debt, it is legal in nature. 2 5 However, since the judgment creditor seeks to collect from one not actually
indebted to him, the creditor is deemed to invoke the equitable
powers of the court and thereby waives his right to a trial by jury.2 0 In
Leedpak v. Julian,20 7 the Supreme Court, New York County, considered the issue of whether the third party, as well as the creditor, forfeits his right to demand a jury trial in such a proceeding.
201 CPLR 5227.
202 CPA 794(2).

203 See Ruvolo v. Long Island R.R., 45 Misc. 2d 136, 256 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1965); 10 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 64:63, at 15 (1966); The Biannual Survey,
40 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 125, 170 (1965).
Although CPLR 5227 is designed to permit the reception of factual disputes at trial
if necessary, there is a limit as to the types of disputes the court can handle. On this
point see Colonial Press of Miami, Inc. v. Bank of Commerce, 71 Misc. 2d 987, 337
N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam) (factual issues should be limited to
questions of possession of property or indebtedness to the judgment debtor).
In a recent case involving a section 5227 special proceeding, the Supreme Court,
Bronx County, affirmed the principle that, inasmuch as CPLR 410 provides for their
trial, disputed issues of fact do not require a dismissal. Suffolk Auto Liquidators, Inc.
v. Eastern Auto Auction, Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 411, 343 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1973).
The interrelationship between CPLR 5225, 5227, and 5239 should be noted. These
sections provide for special proceedings (1) by the judgment creditor against a third
party holding property in which the judgment debtor has an interest, CPLR 5225; (2)
by the judgment creditor against a third party indebted to the judgment debtor, CPLR
5227; and (3) by a third party against the judgment creditor to determine adverse claimants' interests in the property or debt, CPLR 5239.
204 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5225, supp. commentary at 114 (1974).
205 The question of indebtedness is traditionally resolved by an action at law in
which a right to jury trial is guaranteed. See In re Estate of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 256,
200 N.E2d 196, 198, 251 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (1964), citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
200 Leedpak, Inc. v. Julian, 78 Misc. 2d 519, 521, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1974); see In re Estate of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d 196, 251
N.Y.S2d 7 (1964); Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917).
"[Post law-equity] merger cases have held that when a plaintiff either joins legal and
equitable causes of action arising out of the same transaction or seeks both legal and
equitable relief for the same cause of action, he has no right to a jury trial." 4 WK&M
4101.36. This rule was crystallized by then Judge Cardozo in Di Menna v. Cooper &
Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917), and has been firmly adhered to in later
decisions.
20778 Misc. 2d 519, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
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In Leedpak, petitioner had obtained a judgment in an earlier
action. He then sought to enforce that judgment in a special proceeding authorized by CPLR 5227. Respondent contested his indebtedness
to the judgment debtor, claiming that the money had been advanced
to him not as a loan but as a contribution to a joint venture to which
CPLR 5227 does not apply.208 Triable issues of fact having been raised,
the court held that although petitioner had waived his right to a jury
trial by commencing the special proceeding, respondent could nonetheless demand that a jury resolve such issues. 20 9
In granting the alleged debtor the right to a jury trial, the court
relied on V P Supply Corp. v. Normand.210 Under similar circumstances, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, refused to make a
summary determination due to disputed issues of fact.211 The court
recognized that correct procedure mandated a trial of the contested
issues and, though not demanded by either party, reserved the possi212
bility of a jury trial.
The Leedpak court found additional support for its decision in
In re Estate of Garfield,213 wherein the Court of Appeals had granted
respondent-executrix a jury trial in a Surrogate Court proceeding for
an accounting for services performed on behalf of the decedent prior
to his death. The proceeding against the estate, wherein petitioners
sought recovery for legal fees, was held to be an action at law for work,
labor, and services for which the New York Constitution 214 guarantees
a right to trial by jury.215 Although Garfield did not involve a CPLR
5227 proceeding, the Leedpak court found a suitable analogy in that
both cases involved equitable proceedings wherein the court had been
empowered to adjudicate actions that were formerly cognizable at
law.216 In such a case, the court reasoned, it would seem unfitting to
deprive a respondent of his right to a jury trial where the claim "is
traditionally the subject matter of an action at law . . ."217 As the
respondent in Leedpak could have demanded a jury trial had he been
208 Id. at 519-20, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. The respondent also raised the issue as to
whether the money was owed to the corporation which issued the checks or to the judgment debtor individually, if indeed the payments were found to be loans. Id.
2091d. at 521, 356 N.YS.2d at 1013.
210 27 App. Div. 2d 797, 279 N.YS.2d 124 (4th Dep't 1967) (mem.).
211 Id. at 798, 279 N.YS.2d at 125.

212 Id.
213

14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 NZ2d 196, 251 N.YS.2d 7 (1964).

214 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
215 14 N.Y.2d at 258, 200 NX.E2d at 199, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
216 78 Misc. 2d at 520-21, 356 N.Y..2d at 1012-13.
217 Id. at 520, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1013. Contra, First Small Business

46 Misc. 2d 328, 259 N.YS.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).

Inv. Corp. v. Zaretsky,
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sued on the debt by the judgment debtor, the court felt this right
should not be forfeited when the judgment creditor in effect substi21 8
tutes as plaintiff.
In so holding, Leedpak is at odds with the decision of the Supreme
Court, Queens County, in First Small Business Investment Corp. v.
Zaretsky,21 9 involving a special proceeding instituted under CPLR
5225(b). 220 Offering no rationale for its decision, the Zaretsky court
summarily denied both parties a right to a jury trial of the disputed
221
issues.
The decision in Leedpak appears to be the better view.222 It is
well settled that when a plaintiff joins a prayer for equitable relief
with a legal claim, the defendant is not deprived of the right to a jury
trial.223 Likewise, in a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5227,
combining, as it does, legal and equitable elements in one cause of
action, a respondent should not be deprived of a jury trial on issues
224
clearly legal in nature.
ARTICLE 62 - ATTACHMENT
CPLR 6201: Federal court declares New York's attachment statute
unconstitutional.
The New York attachment statute, CPLR 6201,2 25 was designed
21878 Misc. 2d at 521, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1013. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5225, supp.
commentary at 113-14 (1974).
219 46 Misc. 2d 328, 259 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
220 CPLR 5225(b) deals with the judgment debtor's personal property in general while
CPLR 5227 specifically controls where the property involved is a debt owed to the
judgment debtor. The provisions are so analogous that decisions affecting one will, more
than likely, apply equally to the other. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5227, commentary at
124 (1963). See also note 203 supra.
221 The Zaretsky court gave no reason for denying a jury trial, stating summarily
that "in this case the parties are not entitled as of right to a jury trial of the disputed
issues," 46 Misc. 2d at 331, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 703, citing American Sur. Co. v. Conner,

251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929). American Surety merely abrogated the rule that a

creditor need wait for his debt to mature and then obtain a judgment and lien prior to
maintaining a suit in equity to annul a fraudulent conveyance. The Court, however,

reserved comment as to the proper mode of trial where the debt is in dispute. The decision offers scant support for the position taken by the Zaretsky court.
222 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5225, supp. commentary at 113 (1974).
223 See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 396, 115 N.E. 993, 994 (1917);

L.C.J. Realty Corp. v. Back, 37 App. Div. 2d 840, 326 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.);
4 WK&M
4101.37.
224 See In re Estate of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 258, 200 N.E.2d 196, 199, 251 N.Y.S.2d
7, 11 (1964). See also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5225, supp. commentary at 114 (1974). Professor David D. Siegel has commented that where the right to trial by jury is given for a
dispute, "the right ought not to be divested when the identical dispute appears in a
modified procedural context." Id. CPLR 410 acknowledges the fact that jury trials may
be necessary in special proceedings and consequently allows parties to a jury trial to

demand one. Id.

225 Attachment is said to be an extraordinary remedy in that it allows the defendant's

